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Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg  
The Big Leap to the West: The Impact of 
EU on the Finnish Political System 
1. Introduction 
When analysing Finland’s integration policy, one is struck by the speed 
with which the political leadership turned its gaze from the East to the 
West. Within less than a decade Finland changed his status from a non-
aligned country with close political relations with the Soviet Union to a full 
member of both the European Union (EU) and the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). It was not enough that Finland just joined the EU: the last 
three Finnish governments, starting from the centre-right coalition cabinet 
which took office in 1991, have decided that Finland’s place is in the inner 
core of the union. While rhetorically claiming to be interested in 
developing the EU as an intergovernmental project, the practical steps 
taken have shown that the recent governments have been willing to support 
and also put forward initiatives that strengthen the supranational nature of 
the Union. Finland has not at any instance seriously questioned the general 
development of integration: in this sense it has become a harmless 
participant in the inner core of the Union. 
Several observers have praised Finland’s commitment to integration. Finns 
have received credit from their European colleagues for their pragmatic and 
co-operative approach. For example, according to The Economist: 
Since joining the EU in 1995, and despite coming from its most distant 
edge, they [the Finns] have displayed an almost uncanny mastery of its 
workings. Many point to them as the very model of how a “small country” Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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(vast in land mass, but with only 5.2 m people) should operate within the 
EU’s institutions: not preachy like the Swedes, not difficult like the Danes, 
not over-ambitious like the Austrians, merely modest and purposeful, 
matching a sense of principle with a sense of proportion.
1  
Another example was given by the European Voice, which in its leader, 
titled “Finnish presidency ends on triumphant note”, argued among other 
things that  ‘the Finnish presidency has proved once again that small 
countries are often the most adept at managing the EU’s business’ and that 
‘the Finns have shown that a presidency which begins on an unauspicious 
note can end with plaudits from all sides’.
2 
The Finnish determined approach stands in contrast to the hesitant EU-
policies of both Denmark and Sweden. What explains this pragmatism and 
commitment to integration? Does the public share the commitment shown 
by the political elite? We argue that Finnish integration policy is very much 
driven by the need to secure her place among the Western European 
countries and to influence EU decisions in order to protect national 
interests. Support for the deepening of integration or for federalism is weak 
among the public  and the parties, with integration primarily seen as an 
efficient way of furthering national economic and security objectives. 
The chapter is divided into six sections. In the next part we present the 
reasons that led Finland to apply for European Community (EC) 
membership. The third part focuses on the 1994 referendum and explores 
its main issues and cleavages. In the fourth section we analyse the impact 
of membership on party politics and administration. Europeanisation of the 
Finnish polity and public opinion are examined in section five. In the 
concluding section we discuss briefly the main aspects of Finnish 
integration policy, with emphasis on the future development of the Union. 
 
1   Charlemagne, ‘Sauli Niinistö, on Europe’s edge’, The Economist 350 (13.3.1999) : 
8110, 41. 
2    “Finnish presidency ends on triumphant note”, The European Voice 5:46, 13.  The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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2. Application and membership negotiations 
Finland’s foreign relations from the end of the Second World War until the 
early 1990s resembled a balancing act between maintaining close relations 
with the Soviet Union, which accounted for approximately one-quarter of 
Finnish foreign trade, and of having access to Western markets through 
commercial arrangements, mainly the European Free Trade Association 
(Efta). The rapid and unexpected fall of the Soviet empire changed the 
picture almost overnight. EC membership was hardly discussed in public 
before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The political leadership 
remained quiet about the EC, and none of the parties advocated 
membership in the late 1980s. However, the Finnish industry had expressed 
its preferences about the future by investing heavily in Western Europe 
from the mid-1980s  onwards. From 1985 to 1990, Finnish direct net 
investment to EC countries grew six-fold, from 2.18 to 12.47 billion FIM 
(from approximately 0.4 to 2.1 billion euros). During the same period 
corresponding i nvestment flows to West European countries other than the 
Nordic countries grew eight-fold, from 0.86 to 6.52 billion FIM (from 0.14 
to 1.1 billion euros) (Väyrynen 1993: 35). 
The political elite reacted quickly to the changes in Kremlin. Finland 
applied for membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) i n 1990. 
Three of the established parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the 
National Coalition (KOK) and the Swedish People’s Party (RKP)  — 
holding roughly half of the seats in the parliament — came out in favour of 
EC membership during 1990/1991. Following the Swedish application to 
join the EC in July 1991, the debate about the pros and cons of European 
integration began in earnest. Finland applied for EU membership in March 
1992. It would be misleading to claim that the Finnish political elite really 
bothered to explain to the citizens why the government was so eager to 
make the moves westward. The main decisions and subsequent negotiation 
strategies were carefully prepared away from the public eye. One should 
not, on the other hand, overestimate the planning capabilities of the 
political elite: integration issues were not among the top priorities of the 
civil servants at any level and the politicians were, at least until when the Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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decision to apply for EU membership was taken, by and large rather 
uninformed about even the most fundamental aspects of European 
integration.  However, the public was aware of the significance of the 
forthcoming decision. For example, according to a survey carried out in 
May-June 1993, 81 per cent of the respondents identified the membership 
question as Finland’s most important and consequential decision in decades 
(EVA 1993). 
The political climate in which the integration debate took place was also 
different in terms of the domestic situation. During the post-war period 
foreign policy decision-making had been firmly in the hands of the 
President and a narrow circle of the political elite, especially during the 
reign of Mr Urho Kekkonen (1956-1981), with the public appearing to 
endorse the policy of non-alignment. However, President Mauno Koivisto 
(1982-1994) wanted to strengthen parliamentarism and made it clear that 
while he was in favour of EU membership, the actual debate and decision 
was to be conducted by the public and the parties. Koivisto did not want 
security issues to dominate the public debate: he presupposed that the 
majority of the voters would in any case choose their stand on membership 
with mostly security policy considerations in mind (Koivisto 1994, 1995). 
In December 1993 the national parliament, Eduskunta, passed an 
amendment to the Constitution Act (HM § 33a, 15.12.1993/1116) that 
entitled “Parliament to take part in the national preparation of matters to be 
decided in international bodies as legislated in the Parliament Act”. 
According to the same amendment  “the government is empowered, 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 33, to make decisions concerning 
national preparation of issues arising within international organs and, to the 
extent that such a decision is not subject to parliamentary approval nor 
requires regulation by decree, also to decide on other related measures”. 
These changes combined with chapter 4a of the Parliament Act (VJ 4a, 
1551/94), which extended the government’s powers to the national 
preparation of matters relating to EU’s Common  Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), significantly altered the formulation of Finnish foreign 
policy. Thus EU membership acted as a catalyst for a change from a 
President-led foreign policy to a more partisan-based decision-making in The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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foreign relations (see Arter 1995, Jakobson 1998, Törnudd 1996, Väyrynen 
1993). 
Membership negotiations with the Commission started in February 1993 
and were completed in March 1994, lasting altogether only 13 months. It is 
a paradoxical phenomenon that one of the most far-reaching decisions 
concerning the destiny of the country was made under the leadership of the 
government led by the Centre Party (KESK), whose core supporters were 
to be the main losers of joining the Union. The willingness of the Centre 
Party leadership to act in a way that prima facie seemed to be contrary to 
the very core interests of its constituents, indicates the key importance of 
elite-level negotiations and especially of agreements between parties 
forming coalition cabinets in Finnish politics. The centre-right government 
consisted of the Centre Party, the National Coalition, and the Swedish 
People’s Party. The Christian Union (SKL) left the government in 1994 
due to the pro-integrationist stance of the cabinet. Of the three main parties 
only the Social D emocratic Party (SDP) was in opposition, and its 
leadership was strongly in favour of integration. 
In a clever move by the foreign policy leadership, Mr Heikki Haavisto 
(KESK), the long-serving head of The Central Union of Agricultural 
Producers and Forest Owners (MTK), was appointed as the Foreign 
Minister to appease the farming interests within the Centre party. Indeed, 
by far the most difficult task in the membership negotiations was making 
Finnish agriculture compatible with the requirements of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). While agriculture employed at that point only 7 
per cent of the workforce, and accounted for less than 3 per cent of the 
GDP, the sector itself and countryside in general have a strong sentimental 
value for the Finns (Jakobson 1998: 108). Urbanisation of the Finnish 
society started only after the Second World War, later than in her western 
neighbours. Finnish agriculture suffers from several problems, some of 
which are not found elsewhere in the Union. The short growing season, 
especially in the northern parts of the country, the high production costs, 
and the small size of the farms posed the biggest problems. While the 
government accepted the inevitability of downsizing the agricultural sector, 
it sought a transitional period that would have allowed the farmers to adjust Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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better to the CAP. While Finland failed to receive the transition period as it 
would have been against the acquis communautaire, the Commission did 
agree to substantial aid, first by giving the sector two billion FIM to adjust 
to the CAP, and by accepting 85 per cent of arable and pasture land under 
the less favourable area (LFA) subsidy scheme. The Finnish government 
was also permitted to pay additional national subsidies, especially to the 
less-populated regions falling under the so-called zone 6 support, mainly in 
the form of Nordic farming support (pohjoinen tuki), covering 56 per cent 
of agricultural land (Arter 1995: 375). The main primary producers’ 
interest group, MTK, was not satisfied with this compromise and as a result 
spoke against membership before the 1994 referendum. 
The other policy sectors did not receive similar attention from the 
politicians or from the parties. Defence and foreign policy were important 
questions, but while they featured prominently in the domestic debate, they 
did not seem to cause problems in the negotiations, as Finland had agreed 
to all aspects of CFSP. Unlike Denmark or Sweden, Finland had explicitly 
stated that it would accept the Maastricht Treaty without any reservations 
or opt-out clauses. Both the government led by the Centre Party and 
President Koivisto made this clear. In December 1993 Foreign Minister 
Heikki Haavisto stated that Finland was ready to agree to the CFSP, 
including its d efence objectives (Arter 1995). To summarize, it is fair to 
claim that Finland was not a difficult negotiating partner. The government 
was not ready to jeopardize the positive outcome of the negotiations by 
being too ambitious or by tabling any specific demands (excluding 
agriculture) that could have been opposed by the member states or the 
Commission. 
3. The October 1994 referendum 
A consultative referendum on EU membership was held on October 16, 
1994. Even though the differences in the material and intellectual resources 
of the different camps were enormous, neither side could be sure of victory 
as the date approached. According to opinion polls carried out in the spring 
(45 per cent) and in the autumn (46 per cent) of 1994 only less than half of The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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the respondents were in favour of joining  the Union. However, in the 
referendum a narrow majority of 56.9 per cent voted in favour and 43.1 per 
cent against membership. Turnout was 74 per cent. Several factors 
contributed to the result. 
The supporters of membership stressed that only by joining the Union 
would Finland be able to influence decisions that in any case affected her. 
Perhaps more importantly, this would place Finland firmly in the context 
where she historically and culturally belongs — among Western European 
countries. Those in favour o f membership went also to great lengths to 
assure the voters that the country’s independence was not for sale. The 
opponents claimed exactly the opposite: membership would drastically 
reduce Finland’s independence, especially as the Finnish government had 
agreed to adhere to all Maastricht objectives, including EMU and CFSP. 
The supporters of membership had three significant advantages. Firstly, a 
clear majority of the political leadership was openly in favour of joining the 
EU. This included the three main parties (SDP, the Centre and the National 
Coalition), the government, the parliamentary majority, and both the 
former President Koivisto and the new President Martti Ahtisaari. The 
opponents had no prominent leaders who could persuade people with the 
same effect. Secondly, almost the whole business and administrative elite 
was enthusiastically in favour of membership. And thirdly, the national 
media, and also most provincial newspapers, supported membership (Mörä 
1999). Indeed, in hindsight the opponents gained a very impressive share of 
the votes, given that the political and economic establishment was almost 
unanimously in favour of joining the Union.  Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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Table 1 
The percentage of voters in favour of EU membership in the 1994 referendum. 
GROUPS  YES  NO 
Gender     
Men  61  39 
Women  54  46 
Age     
15-24 years  54  46 
25-49 years  58  42 
50- years  56  44 
Education     
Primary school  46  54 
Comprehensive or vocational school  55  45 
A-levels/higher school examination  66  34 
University degree  72  28 
Profession     
Farmer  6  94 
Blue-collar workers  53  47 
White-collar workers  65  35 
Management, entrepreneurs  73  27 
Party affiliation     
Left Alliance  24  76 
Social Democratic Party  75  25 
Centre Party  36  64 
National Coalition  89  11 
Swedish People’s Party  85  15 
Green League  55  45 
Region     
South  62  38 
Central  55  45 
North  42  58 
All  57  43 
Sources: Paloheimo (1995: 117). Party figures from Sänkiaho (1994). The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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Table 1 shows the voting behaviour of various citizen groups in the 1994 
referendum. Higher educational qualifications, living in urban areas 
(south), and being a white-collar worker or an entrepreneur correlated 
positively with support for membership. In terms of gender the difference 
was not that large, with men only slightly more in favour of joining the 
Union. Opponents came mainly from the rural areas and were less well 
educated. Only 6 per cent of the farmers voted “Yes”. 
The issue cut across traditional party cleavages. The two most pro-
membership parties were the National Coalition and the Swedish People’s 
Party, with 89 and 85 per cent of the party supporters respectively voting in 
favour of membership. The leadership of the Social Democratic Party was 
behind membership, and 75 per cent of party voters took a similar stand in 
the referendum. The Centre Party was divided over the issue. While the 
party congress had adopted  — following a resignation threat from the 
chairman and PM Esko Aho — a pro-membership line in June 1994, only 
36 per cent of the party supporters favoured membership in the referendum. 
The Left Alliance (VAS) and the Green League (VIHR) did not adopt 
formal positions prior to the referendum. 24 per cent of the Left Alliance 
supporters and 55 per cent of the Greens voted “Yes”. The only anti-
membership Eduskunta parties were the marginal Christian U nion and the 
Rural Party (SMP), whose leadership and voters were almost unanimously 
against membership (Paloheimo 1995, Pesonen ed. 1994, Sänkiaho 1995). 
The Eduskunta approved membership on November 18, 1994. In the final 
vote a majority of two-thirds was required. 152 voted in favour, 45 against, 
1 abstained, and 1 was absent (the Speaker does not vote). The National 
Coalition, SDP, the Swedish People’s Party, and the Greens voted in favour 
of membership, while the Christian League and the Finnish Rural P arty 
were against. Both the Centre Party and the Left Alliance were divided on 
the matter.
3 
 
3   Finland’s party system is characterised by polarised pluralism and a high degree of 
fragmentation. As measured by the effective number of parties, Eduskunta is one of 
the most fragmented parliaments in Europe. The left-right dimension is the domiant 
political cleavage. During the 1990s the national-international cleavage, intertwined 
with the centre-periphery one, increased in significance. There is no extreme right-Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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4. Party politics and public administration 
The three latest member states joined the EU at a time when the Union was 
undergoing far-reaching changes. Preparations  for the EMU were well 
under way and meant tight budgetary discipline and curtailing public sector 
expenditure. The next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was to begin in 
March 1996. Finland was also to take on the responsibilities of Council 
Presidency for the latter half of 1999. Thus there was little time for 
adjustment. In this section we shall analyse how the Finnish political 
system  — the parliament, government, parties, and the bureaucracy  — 
have adapted to the new situation.   
According to the so-called intergovernmentalist school of integration 
theorising, which stresses the primacy of member state governments, the 
national executives have used the European institutions in a two-level game 
to strengthen their autonomy vis-à-vis other national actors, primarily the 
representative bodies. The dominant position of national governments in 
both domestic and European politics, combined with the constant 
interaction and policy co-ordination between the two levels, reduces the 
influence of parliaments at all stages of the decision-making process. 
According to Moravcsik (1993) EU institutions shift the balance of 
domestic initiative and influence through providing governmental policy 
initiatives greater political legitimacy and through granting governments 
greater domestic agenda-setting power. Notwithstanding such behaviour 
from national governments, comparative case studies seem to confirm that 
 
wing party in Finland. The m oderate right consists of the National Coalition, the 
Swedish People’s Party, the Centre Party, and the Christian Union. The left consists 
of the mainstream Social Democratic Party and the Left Alliance. The rural and 
peripheral areas are the strongholds of the Centre Party, the Christian Union and the 
True Finns, the successor of the Rural Party. The National Coalition, the Social 
Democratic Party, the Green League and the Left Alliance draw their support 
mainly from the urbanised southern parts of the country. The Green League is one 
of the strongest environmental parties in Europe, and in 1995 became the first green 
party to gain a cabinet seat in Europe. Recent governments have been oversized 
coalitions and normally bring together parties across the political spectrum. The 
only exception was the bourgeois government of 1991-95. Governments are as a 
rule been formed around two of the three main parties: the Centre, National 
Coalition and the SDP. The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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the systemic features of the decisional process favour the executive branch 
and insulate the representative institutions (see Bergman and Damgaard 
eds. 2000, Rometsch and Wessels eds. 1996).   
However, in Finland integration has strengthened parliamentarism in two 
ways: through facilitating the move from a semi-presidential system 
towards a more government-led polity, a nd by improving the legislature’s 
overall scrutiny of the executive, domestic legislation included (Raunio and 
Wiberg 2000). National EU policy has been dictated by the government, 
with the Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen (SDP) in a very central role. Both 
Lipponen governments (1995-1999 and 1999) have been strongly 
committed to steering Finland into the inner core of the Union.  The 
President has mainly intervened when foreign policy matters are on the EU 
agenda. While the Eduskunta cannot be categorized as a  strong policy-
influencing legislature, it has subjected the government to tight scrutiny in 
EU matters. In fact, of the fifteen member state legislatures, the Eduskunta 
is probably the most effective in controlling its government in EU decision-
making (Raunio 1999a). All standing committees are involved in the 
handling of EU issues. The two main committees responsible for European 
questions are the Grand Committee ( Suuri valiokunta) and the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, the former handling first (EC) and third pillar (Justice 
and Home Affairs [JHA]) issues and the latter second pillar (CFSP) 
matters. The Grand Committee scrutinises the behaviour of Finnish 
representatives in the European Council, gives voting instructions to 
cabinet ministers attending the Council meetings, and participates in 
national policy formulation on matters to be decided at the European level. 
The strength of the Finnish parliamentary system for controlling the 
government in European matters is in the proactive and early involvement 
of  specialised standing committees, which greatly increases the ability of 
the Eduskunta to influence government behaviour. The parliament is rather 
well equipped to monitor what the cabinet does in relation to the EU due to 
the fact that parliamentary committees have a constitutionally regulated 
unlimited access to information from the government. However, the Grand 
Committee focuses its scrutiny mainly on selected issues depending on the 
interests of the MPs. The overwhelming majority of EU legislation is Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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passed by the chamber without any real political controversy.
4 Overall the 
parliament has been more critical of integration than the two rainbow 
governments led by PM Paavo Lipponen.
5 Indeed, European questions 
often cross-cut the government-opposition dimension, with the Eduskunta 
as an institution putting pressure on the government. Also MPs from the 
governing parties subject the ministers to close scrutiny, not just frustrated 
opposition backbenchers. The Grand Committee has also insisted that all 
relevant information is distributed to both the government and opposition 
MPs on equal terms (Raunio and Wiberg 1997, 2000, Wiberg and Raunio 
1996). 
Why was the national parliament been accorded a much stronger role in 
Finland than in Sweden? First, there was a strongly felt need among the 
political elite to anchor integration nationally. Given the outcome of the 
referendum, this was perhaps a political necessity that could not be 
overlooked. The government and the parliament wanted to ensure that the 
direction of  national integration policy and the more detailed negotiating 
positions of the government enjoyed support among the representatives of 
the people (Jääskinen 2000). The parliamentary channel was perceived as 
the most legitimate instrument for achieving that goal. Second, this 
arrangement also served the interests of the more Eurosceptical MPs.  
Turning to the executive branch, within the government a new portfolio of 
a Minister of European Affairs was created following the March 1995 
general elections. The m inister was responsible for co-ordinating 
government’s EU policy, but the experiment did not work as planned as 
individual ministries dominated decision-making within their jurisdictions. 
There is therefore no Minister of European Affairs in the government 
appointed following the elections held in March 1999. A more important 
 
4   This was nicely illustrated when PM Lipponen in September 2000 expressed his 
worry about the lack of interest in EU issues in Finland, both among the public and 
at the elite level, the Eduskunta included. For example, Lipponen wondered why 
MPs seldom bring up European matters during question-time.  See ‘Lipponen: 
Eurooppa menee eteenpäin’, STT 29.9.2000.  
5   The first five-party government led by Lipponen (1995-99) controlled 72 per cent 
(144 / 200 MPs) of Eduskunta seats, while the second Lipponen government 
controls 70 per cent (140 / 200 MPs) of the seats. The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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forum for policy co-ordination is the Cabinet European Union Committee, 
also established in 1995. Government work is co-ordinated through its four 
statutory ministerial committees ( ministerivaliokunta), the other three being 
the Cabinet Foreign and Security Policy Committee, Cabinet Finance 
Committee, and the Cabinet Economic Policy Committee. All committees 
are chaired by the Prime Minister, and they prepare decisions which are 
then given the final seal of approval by the plenary session of the whole 
cabinet. 
The Foreign Ministry was initially given the overall responsibility for 
handling European matters. The Ministry was in charge of co-ordinating 
ministerial EU policies and was the home of the EU Secretariat. However, 
this arrangement met a lot of criticism, especially from the individual 
ministries. Moving the responsibility for European issues from the Foreign 
Office to the Prime Minister’s Office was argued to enhance the capacity of 
the whole state bureaucracy and the parliament to process EU issues. More 
importantly, this was seen to tie EU politics more closely to its proper 
context of domestic policy-making. The EU Secretariat was therefore 
transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office in the summer of 2000. The 
Prime Minister’s Office had meanwhile already carved out a prominent 
role for itself, in particular in relation to the EU Summits. The Prime 
Minister usually represents Finland in the European Council. However, the 
President can also be present, especially when foreign policy matters are on 
the agenda.
6 
Governmental EU decision-making is heavily sectionalised. Each ministry 
enjoys much freedom of action in the preparation of issues and in actual 
decision-making. This fragmentation of authority and lack of inter-
 
6   The Eduskunta’s Committee for Constitutional Law decided prior to membership 
that the Prime Minister should represent Finland in the EU summits. However, 
President Ahtisaari refused to accept this interpretation. In May 1995 the Prime 
Minister announced a s tatement, formulated jointly with the President’s office, 
according to which the PM will always attend the summits and President will attend 
them whenever she/he chooses. The current president, Mrs Tarja Halonen (SDP), 
announced upon taking office in March 2000 that she would take part in the 
summits. The dispute is important from the point of view of parliamentarism as the 
President is not accountable to the Eduskunta. Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
  16
ministerial co-ordination has manifested itself particularly in the allocation 
of structural funds. The departmentalisation mirrors the situation found in 
Brussels. The work of the Council of the European Union is also  very 
sectionalised, and thus each policy domain (agriculture, environment, 
transport, social affairs etc.) has gradually built its own networks with not 
much interaction with other policy sectors. 
Formally, the main inter-ministerial co-ordinating body is  the Committee 
for EU Matters located at the Foreign Office. It has 17 members: high-level 
officials from the ministries ( kansliapäälliköt), the Prime Minister's Office, 
the Office of the President, the Bank of Finland, the Office of the Attorney 
General and Åland. The Committee has 38 sections (in 2000) that operate 
under the appropriate ministries. The sections are consultative and their 
function is to co-ordinate EU matters within the respective ministries. 
Sections include also representatives from relevant interest groups. 
Officials present matters to sections for discussion and inform them of 
issues under preparation. When agreement is reached, the section procedure 
provides a sufficient basis for determining Finland's final position. 
Otherwise the matter is presented to the Committee for EU Matters and/or 
the Cabinet European Union Committee. The Cabinet EU Committee, 
chaired by the PM and with all government parties represented, has become 
an important f orum for formulating national policy in salient i ntegration 
matters (Mattila 2000). 
The government is represented in the EU through Finland’s permanent 
representation, which has performed a crucial role during the first years of 
membership. The permanent representation not only participates in the 
work of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), but has 
also been an important source of information to Finnish civil servants, 
ministers and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The 
permanent representative to the EU operates under instructions from the 
government (Murto 1996, Raunio and Wiberg 2000). 
Persuasion and government credibility are the two key dimensions when 
analysing party adaptation to membership (Raunio 1999b). Persuasion in 
the sense that party leaders have needed to convince  their followers to The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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accept their parties’ pro-EU/EMU policies. Government credibility means 
that any party wishing to join the cabinet must be seen as a reliable partner. 
This in turn implies acceptance of both Union membership and the EMU.
7 
The best example of this mechanism at work is the behaviour of the Centre 
Party, which has been in opposition since 1995. While the Centre was 
against Finland’s membership in the third stage of the EMU from 1999, 
following the Eduskunta vote in April 1998 it indicated that it would 
respect the will of the parliamentary majority and would not demand 
Finland’s exit from the EMU. In similar fashion the leaders of the Green 
League and the Left Alliance have come out in favour of EMU after initial 
rejections. Such behaviour is explained by the leaderships’ concern not to 
exclude their parties from future government negotiations. 
European integration has arguably increased the status and independent 
decision-making role of party chairmen (who often are members of the 
cabinet) in all member states. Finland is no exception. Party leaders have 
been central figures in policy formulation on European issues. This is 
perhaps most pronounced in SDP, where the Prime Minister and party 
chairman Paavo Lipponen was throughout the 1990s determined to lead 
Finland into the inner circle of the Union. He was also one of the first 
members of the political elite to publicly support Finnish EC/EU 
membership in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Finnish parties and 
especially party leaders often emphasise in their political rhetorics that the 
EU remains an association of independent states, and like to downplay the 
overall significance and legislative powers of the Union. Apart from CAP 
no party has really put forward any concrete proposals to reduce the powers 
of the EU. All Eduskunta parties support Finland’s EU membership. Those 
 
7   Adjustment to EMU membership, and especially the target of meeting the required 
Maastricht convergence criteria, meant significant cuts in public sector spending. 
That these cuts were implemented without any serious political controversy shows 
(a) the broad overall consensus among the political, administrative, and economic 
elite in favour of the changes, and (b) the determined political leadership shown by 
the government. The risks involved in EMU were well acknowledged by the 
relevant actors, but once the decision to meet the convergence criteria was taken, 
the overwhelming majority of the political elite accepted the chosen direction 
without much protest. Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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parties that were against EU membership at the time of the 1994 
referendum  — True Finns and the Christian Union  — focus now on 
resisting moves to deepen integration.  
On the other hand, no Finnish party has come out in favour of establishing 
a federal European state.  All governing parties support EMU and the 
cautious strengthening of the EU’s legislative powers. The National 
Coalition and the Swedish People’s Party are also ready to make limited 
concessions to develop EU’s foreign and defence policy. The Green 
League has altered its position quite radically since the referendum, and 
argues that EMU needs to be counterbalanced by European-level social, 
environmental and taxation p olicies. The SDP and the Left Alliance 
emphasize European-level action to achieve traditional leftist goals such as 
safeguarding workers’ rights and fighting unemployment. The remaining 
parties are more or less in favour of the status quo, with the main 
opposition party the Centre among them.  
Integration issues remain fairly peripheral in partisan debates in Finland. 
One of the reasons explaining this is that almost all parties have internal 
conflicts over Europe, with especially the Centre and the Left Alliance 
divided over integration. This was evident in the 1996 and 1999 
Euroelections. While parties issued rather detailed election manifestos or 
European programmes, individual candidates were free to conduct their 
own campaigns. There was hardly any pressure from the party leadership to 
force the candidates to follow the agreed party line, with the leading 
candidates of the Centre Party and the Left Alliance adopting a very EU 
critical line.
8 By allowing individual party members  — also at the elite 
level  — to deviate from the agreed party positions, parties try to prevent 
internal fragmentation and the loss of voters to competing parties (Pesonen 
ed. 2000). Focusing on European matters is very likely not a vote winning 
 
8   Such intra-party competition is facilitated by the Finnish electoral system. Also in 
national parliamentary elections the decentralized candidate selection system, 
together with open  lists, leads to a situation in which parliamentary party groups 
almost as a rule include troublesome MPs. On the other hand, the rules of the 
electoral game f acilitate intra-party protest based around individual persons and 
thereby reduce or lessen the possibility of establishing organized factions.   The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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ticket in any Finnish elections: the  electorate is rather ignorant and 
uninterested in integration. Discussing integration issues during electoral 
campaigns would probably only disturb and irritate the voters. 
Regarding state administration, the changes introduced by the membership 
were already mainly carried out in connection with the EEA agreement 
which came into effect from the start of 1994. Finland had to implement all 
relevant single market legislation, and this led to an enormous increase in 
annually enacted new laws. In 1995 the Eduskunta passed an all-time high 
of 777 laws. During 1996 and 1997 the trend reversed, however, indicating 
that the peak in the mid-1990s resulted from the obligation to implement 
EC legislation.  
Figure 1 
Annually enacted laws in Finland, 1945-1998. 
Annually enacted laws, 1945-1998
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Source: Säädöskokoelma, 1945-1998. 
While EU membership has necessitated the establishment of new 
organisational structures, the overall organisation of the state bureaucracy 
has remained intact. European matters have increased the workload of most Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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bureaucrats, especially in those ministries most involved in EU affairs, 
such as Agriculture and Forestry, Finance, Trade and Industry, and Foreign 
Affairs ministries. The overall number of ministerial staff has escalated as a 
result of membership, in particular in the above-mentioned ministries. Also 
the Council Presidency in the latter half of 1999 increased the workload 
and number of civil servants. National representatives to the Commission 
and Council working groups are assigned on the basis of their policy 
responsibilities. Participation in EU policy-making has required a lot of 
staff training, with particular emphasis on linguistic skills.
9 As shown by 
the Commission’s statistics, implementation of Community legislation is 
taken seriously by the  public authorities (Commission 1995-). The 
EURODOC-system is used actively in order to monitor the current 
implementation situation. The exception is the autonomous province of 
Åland, where implementation is hampered by the lack of resources. 
5. Public opinion on membership and integration 
Integration is and has since the early 1990s been a highly salient issue in 
Finnish politics, causing much heated debates in the media and in the 
parties. However, it must be emphasized that, unlike in Sweden, the debate 
is focused on the benefits, drawbacks, and future of integration, not on the 
actual membership itself. Also in contrast with Sweden, the whole political 
elite and the mass media accepts membership and no party or nationally 
important politician demands that Finland should leave the Union. 
Nevertheless, for the overwhelming majority of the population, European 
integration does not mean much: the issues are considered too complicated, 
too technical, and too far removed from the everyday activities of ordinary 
people. 
 
9   There has been an enormous education campaign to teach the bureaucrats to operate 
in the new EU environment.  Approximately 800-900 civil servants were given 
special training as part of preparing for the Council Presidency of July-December 
1999. We are grateful to Professor Markku Temmes (University of Helsinki) for 
information on the impact of membership on Finnish administration. The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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Turning to the Finnish public opinion, when asked how the respondents 
currently feel about the Finnish EU membership, the responses are shown 
in Table 2. Due to measurement errors (the results are based on mail 
questionnaires with response rates a round 50 per cent), and taking the 
relevant confidence intervals into consideration, it is fair to claim that the 
attitudes have been stable: no significant changes have occurred over time. 
The three respondent groups have been approximately of equal size, with 
those in favour of membership slightly more numerous. 
Table 2 
Finnish public opinion on membership in the EU, 1996-1998. 
  Positive  Neutral  Don’t know  Negative 
Fall 1996  38  33  2  26 
Fall 1997  38  32  2  29 
Fall 1998  43  30  1  25 
Source: EVA (1998, Figure 2, p. 11). 
 
The Finnish public opinion has since 1994 been covered also by 
Eurobarometers, conducted by personal interviews twice a year by the 
Commission. Whether the respondents perceive membership to be a good 
thing for their country has been measured by using the following question: 
’Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY’S) membership 
of the European Union is: A good thing/A bad thing/Neither good nor 
bad/Don’t know’ (Table 3). Let us compare the Finnish responses with the 
averages for the whole Union during Finnish membership. Fewer Finns 
than their fellow EU citizens seem to evaluate their own country’s 
membership as a good thing. The share of those who find their country’s 
membership a bad thing is greater in Finland than across the whole Union. Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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Table 3 
European and Finnish public opinion on whether own country’s 
membership is a good or bad thing. 
 
Eurobarometer (fieldwork)  EU15 
Good thing/Bad thing 
Finland 
Good thing/Bad thing 
EB 42 (December 1994)  57/13  46/17 
EB 43 (April-May 1995)  56/14  47/18 
EB 44 (October-December 1995)  53/15  45/21 
EB 45 (February-May 1996)  48/15  37/24 
EB 46 (October-November 1996)  48/17  39/23 
EB 47 (February-June 1997)  46/15  37/23 
EB 48 (October-November 1997)  49/14  39/25 
EB 49 (April-May 1998)  51/12  36/25 
EB 50 (October-November 1998)  54/12  45/21 
EB 51 (March-April 1999)  49/12  45/19 
EB 52 (October-November 1999)  51/13  44/20 
EB 53 (April-May 2000)  49/14  40/22 
Source: Eurobarometers. The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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Table 4 
European and Finnish public opinion on whether one’s own country has 
benefited from membership. 
Eurobarometer  EU 15 
Benefited / Not benefited 
Finland 
Benefited / Not benefited 
EB 42  48/32  66/20 
EB 43  46/36  36/41 
EB 44  44/35  39/42 
EB 45  45/34  34/49 
EB 46  42/37  37/45 
EB 47  41/36  37/44 
EB 48  44/35  36/49 
EB 49  46/32  33/52 
EB 50  49/31  39/44 
EB 51  44/29  43/40 
EB 52  46/31  40/41 
EB 53  47/32  42/44 
Source: Eurobarometers. 
 
Europeans have also been asked to evaluate whether their own country has 
benefited or not from EU membership by using the following question: 
“Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR 
COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the 
European Union: Benefited/Not benefited/Don’t know” (Table 4). Fewer 
Finns than EU citizens on average think that their own c ountry has 
benefited from membership, bar the time when Finland was not yet a 
member of the Union. The share of Finns who think that their own country 
has not benefited from membership has been higher than the EU average, 
again with the exception of the survey carried out in December 1994. There 
is no good explanation why the Finns took such a dramatically more 
sceptic attitude immediately after membership became a reality. The Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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opinion climate has been rather stable for the whole research period with 
respect to the both last questions. 
In conclusion, European affairs are distant among the electorate. The 
situation in Finland is thus no different from the other member states: 
citizens are fairly weakly attached to the Union, and their level of 
knowledge of the EU, and particularly its decision-making structure, 
remains low. One could say that there are only Eurosceptics in Finland. 
National opinion surveys testify that Finns are particularly concerned about 
the influence of small member countries in the Union  (Raunio 2000). 
However, one can also a rgue that the preferences and rhetorics of 
politicians and parties, and the way national integration policy is 
formulated at the elite level, have an impact on how the electorate relates to 
integration. The formulation of Finnish EU policy is co-ordinated at the 
highest political level, in the Cabinet EU Committee and in the Grand 
Committee of the Eduskunta, with the opposition parties also involved in 
decision-making. This consensus-building b etween parties may well have 
beneficial consequences in terms of influencing decisions at the European 
level, but it also fairly effectively reduces conflict between parties and 
removes EU issues from party competition.         
6. A Europeanised polity? 
Instead of talking about the Europeanisation of the Finnish polity, it is 
better to speak of pragmatic adaptation. We define Europeanisation as “an 
incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the 
degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech 1994: 
69). With the referendum outcome clear, the Finnish political system  — 
parties, parliament, government, and the bureaucracy  — started adjusting 
to the challenges brought by membership. In the case of ministerial civil 
servants the adaptation had already to a great extent begun during the EEA 
phase. The Finnish approach, at least on the elite level, has thus been 
pragmatic, with the emphasis on defending national economic and political 
interests in the EU. Opposition to integration, both at the elite level and The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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among the public, is considerably weaker in Finland than in Denmark or 
Sweden. This pragmatic approach is at least partly a legacy of the Cold 
War era, when Finnish foreign policy leadership needed to make the best of 
less than ideal circumstances.  
Membership has added a new significant cleavage to the Finnish political 
system. The traditional left-right dimension has been complemented, if not 
superseded, by the rural-urban cleavage which is intertwined with the 
centre-periphery divide. Among the public the membership issue remains 
controversial six years after the referendum, with public opinion surveys 
showing that Finns are more hesitant than the average EU citizens about 
integration. The anxiety is understandable, especially in the rural and 
northern r egions. In 1994 the number of Finnish farms was 121 000, in 
1996 it had dropped to 92 000, and it is expected to level at 65 000 
(Jakobson 1998: 109). However, against this  widespread unease, the 
political and business elite, lead by the two Lipponen rainbow 
governments, has been determined to take Finland into the inner core of the 
Union. The gap was well illustrated by the decision on whether to join the 
EMU, the membership of which was approved by the Eduskunta in April 
1998 with 135 MPs for, 61 against, one abstaining, and two absent. At the 
same time public opinion surveys reported that only around 40 per cent of 
the citizens were in favour of EMU. 
But how far is Finland ready to go? Considering the utmost importance of 
integration issues, the almost constant lack of any serious public discussion 
of the future of Finnish integration policy is disturbing. The Finnish 
political elite has not encouraged any debates about alternative scenarios 
regarding Europe. Without any rival plans, there can be no real debate, and 
without debate there is no informed public opinion or sufficient command 
of substantive issues. Significantly, there is no plan B: the current 
government has not  even really considered any alternative scenarios, such 
as what kind of policy to adopt in case of a serious backlash for the EU, or 
what is Finland’s position regarding the division of powers between the 
Union and its member states. Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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The government has constantly underlined the importance of being present 
at the table where decisions concerning Finland are taken. This argument 
was used extensively both during the referendum campaign and also in 
relation to entering the EMU. This logic indicates the basic substance of 
Finnish EU policy. However, the government has not, at least not publicly, 
made it clear how much the current Finnish government is willing to pay in 
order to achieve its policy objectives. Moreover, apart from the general 
argument that national  interests can be best protected through active and 
constructive participation in decision-making, the government has not 
really explained what benefits Finland derives from being in the inner core 
of the Union.
10 At the same time the political elite is willing to make only 
fairly limited concessions in the direction of supranational decision-
making. Finland is a unitary state and federalism as an ideology has not 
been a part of the Finnish political vocabulary. Thus the nation-state logic 
dominates both political rhetorics and the programmes and policies of the 
government and the parties. While the government and the president are 
willing to e xtend the use of majority voting in the Council of Ministers, 
including in CFSP matters, they also want the Council to remain the main 
decision making body. Thus the government and the major parties are more 
or less in favour of the current institutional status quo. 
The government has argued that the EU should adopt a policy towards its 
Northern regions in similar fashion to the Mediterranean countries. The 
initiative put forward by PM Paavo Lipponen in 1997  — the Northern 
Dimension  — focuses primarily on improving EU-Russian relations and 
co-operation in the Baltic and Barents sea regions through a variety of 
technical and financial assistance schemes. However, at the time of writing 
(November 2000) it is too early to say anything more detailed about the 
scope and range of the actual measures to be implemented.
11 
 
10  See Matti Vanhanen, “Onko Euroopan unionin ydintä ylipäätään olemassa?”, 
Helsingin Sanomat 3.11.2000.  For a more thorough discussion on these points, see 
the concluding chapter in Raunio and Wiberg eds. (2000).    
11  The Vienna European Council, 11-12 December 1998, accepted an interim report 
submitted by the Commission on a Northern Dimension for the Policies of the 
Union. The Commission report was largely based on the Finnish initiative tabled in 
the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. Co-operation in the The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
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Before membership one of the most repeated claims was that Finland can 
best protect her interests by participating in European integration. This 
political proposition is not wholly without foundation: the economic 
indicators, with the partial exception of unemployment, testify that the 
country has benefited from integration. Inflation and interest rates have 
been maintained at low levels, and economic growth has been 
extraordinarily rapid (Widgrén 2000). It appears that there have been no 
serious instances in which Finnish positions have been overruled in EU 
decision-making. For example, in the Agenda 2000 negotiations Finland 
achieved successfully her core agricultural and regional policy goals. 
However, after six years of membership, it is still too early to make any 
definitive evaluations of the benefits and drawbacks of membership.  
 
following policy areas have been prioritised: energy, raw materials, environment 
and nuclear safety, border controls, trade, transport and communication, health and 
social policy, and research and education. The Foreign Minister Conference on the 
Northern Dimension in Helsinki in November 1999 discussed the concept,  and 
further progress was made at the Helsinki European Council held 10-11 December, 
1999. The Presidency conclusions of the Summit stated: ‘The European Council 
welcomes the conclusions of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference on the Northern 
Dimension held 11 and 12 November 1999 in Helsinki and the intention of the 
future Swedish Presidency to organise a high-level follow-up. The European 
Council invites the Commission to prepare, in cooperation with the Council and in 
consultation with the partner countries, an Action Plan for the Northern Dimension 
in the external and cross-border policies of the European Union with a view to 
presenting it for endorsement at the Feira European Council in June 2000.’    Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
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